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CHOOSING A MECHANISM FOR LAND
REDISTRIBUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES
Andre Sawchenko
Abstract: The Philippines' Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program needs
changes because it is not efficiently achieving social justice for the rural poor in the
present, nor is it establishing a framework for equitable economic growth in the future. A
land reform program in the Philippines can accomplish its objectives only to the extent
that it redistributes land. Market assisted land reform, the recently developed land reform
model being championed by the World Bank, provides little hope for the quick and
extensive redistribution of land needed in the Philippines. The best way for the
Philippine government to modify its land reform program is to refocus on expediting land
redistribution under the mandatory redistribution model that is currently in place. Greater
political will, created by firm resolve and collaboration among and between government
officials and grassroots peasant organizations, will be required. This Comment
recommends several additional policy modifications to better meet the land reform
objectives in the context of an expedited land redistribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Severe poverty is widespread in the Philippines, particularly among
Filipinos who derive their income from agriculture.' This poverty is
perpetuated, in part, by gross inequalities in land ownership.2 Over the past
100 years, several Philippine regimes have promised to address rural poverty
issues by redistributing agrarian land to Philippine peasants.3 The Philippine
government has failed to deliver on these promises, and the peasants' cries
for social justice through genuine agrarian reform continue.4
Over 40% of Filipinos live in poverty according to official government estimates. Solita Collas-
Monsod & Toby C. Monsod, Int'l and Intranat'l Comparisons of Philippine Poverty, in GROWTH,
POVERTY, AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE PHILIPPINES 47-48, tbl.1 (Arsenio M. Balisacan & Shigeaki
Fujisaki eds., 1998). In this estimate, poverty is defined as having insufficient income to satisfy a
minimum amount of food and other basic needs. Id. at 49. Two thirds of all rural households live in
poverty, the vast majority of which are dependent on agriculture for income, and agriculture is also the
most common income-generating activity for impoverished urban households. Id.
2 Arsenio M. Balisacan, What Do We Really Know-or Don't Know--About Economic Inequality
and Poverty in the Philippines?, in GROWTH, POVERTY, AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE PHILIPPINES,
supra note 1, at 1, 41.
JAMES PUTZEL, A CAPTIVE LAND: THE POLITICS OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN THE PHILIPPINES 2-3
(1992). JOHN BATARA, THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM: MORE MISERY FOR THE
PHILIPPINE PEASANTRY 84 (1996).
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The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program ("CARP") was
enacted in 1988, purportedly to remedy land ownership inequalities.' While
CARP is the most intensive agrarian land reform measure enacted by the
Philippine legislature, it has proven to be a disappointment after twelve
years of implementation.6  CARP targeted both private and public
agricultural land for redistribution to previously landless peasants. 7
However, very little progress has been made redistributing land from the
private landowners. This lack of progress can be traced to reluctant,
politically powerful landowners, a business community that fears CARP will
hinder foreign investment in agriculture, and the Philippine government's
failure to provide enough resources to implement CARP.
As a result of CARP's ineffectiveness, the Philippine government is
considering replacing the mandatory redistribution mechanism of CARP
with a redistribution strategy known as market-assisted land reform.8
Market assisted land reform is based on willing land transfers between
landowners and beneficiaries, whereas mandatory redistribution is based on
legislative expropriation of private land.9 This Comment argues against the
implementation of this new land redistribution model and in favor of a
recommitment to the CARP mandatory acquisition and distribution model.
It also describes why market-assisted land reform, the strategy currently
being proposed by the World Bank, offers little hope for successful
realization of the primary goals of agrarian reform, namely social justice
through equitable distribution of the profits and power associated with land
ownership.
However, this Comment also argues that in light of the unsatisfactory
results of CARP to this point, new regulatory measures should be introduced
to improve its implementation. Specifically, this Comment makes the case
that the Philippine government must invest more budget resources in land
acquisition and beneficiary support services to expedite the reform process.
s Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act No. 6657) (Phil.) sec. 2 (1988), available in
Chan Robles Virtual Law Library (visited Feb. 2, 2000) <http://www.chanrobles.com/legal4agrarian
law.htm> [hereinafter RA 6657].
6 See Philippine Peasant Institute, CARP Land Acquisition and Distribution Accomplishment as of
December 1998 (visited Mar. 20, 2000) <http://www.ppi.org.ph/programs/research/farm_charts/chart_
main.htm> [hereinafter PPI Webpage].
SATURNINO M. BORRAS, THE BIBINGKA STRATEGY IN LAND REFORM IMPLEMENTATION 141 tbl.4
(1998).
8 DAR Considering 'Market Assisted'Land Distribution, Bus. WORLD (Philippines), Mar. 29, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 5616513 [hereinafter Feasibility Study].
9 Klaus Deininger, Making Negotiated Land Reform Work: Initial Experience from Colombia,
Brazil, and South Africa, available in The World Bank Group Rural Development Working Papers (visited
June 15, 2000) <http://www.worldbank.org/htmldec/PublicationsfWorkpapers/wps2000series/wps2O40/
wps2040.pdf> [hereinafter Initial Experience].
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Part II of this Comment outlines the basic theory of land reform programs.
Part III traces the history of Philippine land reform efforts before 1988 and
examines the legislation that introduced CARP in 1988. Part IV describes
the implementation of CARP from 1988 to the present. Part V identifies and
describes the two different mechanisms for land redistribution available to
complete CARP: (1) the traditional land reform model and (2) market-
assisted land reform. Part VI compares the potential effectiveness of both
mechanisms for the land reform and determines that the traditional land
reform model will be more effective. Part VII lists recommendations for
changes to assist with an expedited completion of CARP.
II. OVERVIEW OF REDISTRIBUTIVE LAND REFORM: ALLEVIATING POVERTY
IN THE RURAL AREAS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Land reform refers to any government-sponsored program that seeks
to remedy inequality in land ownership by redistributing property to the
landless.10 Land reform is one category of government-sponsored programs
that falls under the umbrella of "agrarian reform."" Agrarian reform
programs attempt to address a variety of social, economic, and political
problems often found in the rural areas of developing countries. 12 Agrarian
reform programs include education programs, efforts to extend credit to
residents of rural areas, as well as redistributive land reform programs.
13
Thus, an important objective of agrarian reform is effecting social justice.
14
Land reform helps achieve social justice for impoverished, rural households
by ensuring broader access to land ownership, which in turn improves
agricultural efficiency and provides a secure source of income.'5
Io PUTZEL, supra note 3, at 3.
I Id.
12 Id. at 2.
13 LOURDES SAULO-ADRIANO, A GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM PROGRAM 2 n.1 (Philippine Institute for Development Studies Working Paper Series No. 91-13,
1991).
14 See Klaus Deininger & Hans Binswanger, The Evolution of the World Bank's Land Policy 5-6,
Jun. 24, 1998, available in The World Bank Group Land Policy Papers and Materials (visited Aug. 14,
2000) < http://www.worldbank.org/search.htm>. One Philippine expert on agrarian reform has written that
"the function of agrarian reform is to achieve equity rather than productivity." Exceptions to Free Market
Principle, MANILA STANDARD, Sept. 9, 1999, available in 1999 WL 27425841.
1' Irma Adelman & Sherman Robinson, Income Distribution and Development, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 949, 990-91 (1988).
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A. Land Ownership Inequality in Developing Countries
In developing countries landowners often wield great economic power
over large populations of landless peasants that live in rural areas. 16 Farm
laborers in developing countries work for low wages and have little job
security because unemployment rates are high and workforces are
predominantly unskilled. 17  Tenancy arrangements generally carry little
more security, often leaving the tenant's household in a dangerous financial
position in the case of a crop failure, as tenants are often forced to pay a
large portion of crops to the landlord under sharecropping agreements.' 8
Moreover, in these countries the economic power associated with land
ownership is often accompanied by social and political power at both the
local and national levels. 19
B. Land Reform Defined
Although the terms "land reform" and "agrarian reform" have become
almost synonymous, strictly speaking, land reform refers only to one aspect
of a broader agrarian reform plan.20 Land reform is an intentional alteration
of the distribution of agricultural property rights.21 In many developing
countries, rural land property rights are concentrated in the hands of a small
percentage of the population.22 Land reforms attempt to transfer property
rights from landowners to landless citizens, either directly or indirectly.
Examples of land reform strategies are direct redistributions of land
ownership, changes to the regulations that govern land exchanges, and
changes to the land tenure regulations.24 Many scholars believe that
redistributive land reform, a method of agrarian reform, which directly
redistributes land to landless citizens, is indispensable to achieving social
16 REHMAN SOBHAN, RURAL POVERTY AND AGRARIAN REFORM IN THE PHILIPPINES 26 (United
Nations FAO In Depth Study Series No. 2, 1983).
17 ROY PROSTERMAN & TIM HANSTAD, LAND REFORM: NEGLECTED, YET EssENTIAL I (Rural
Development Institute Reports on Foreign Aid and Development No. 87, 1995).
1 SOBHAN, supra note 16, at 70.
19 PROSTERMAN & HANSTAD, supra note 17, at 3.
20 PUTZEL, supra note 3, at 3. Recently, lawmakers opposed to redistributive reform have begun to
replace the term 'land reform' with 'agrarian reform' to shift the focus from redistribution of land
ownership to productivity and land market reform. Id.
21 id.
22 Land Policy, supra note 14, at 25.
MICHAEL P.TODARO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 322 (1989).24 PurZEL, supra note 3, at 3.
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justice in a predominantly agricultural society with unequal distribution of
land ownership.25
C. Redistributive Land Reform Helps Alleviate Poverty in the Rural
Areas of Developing Countries
Redistributive land reform alleviates rural poverty and helps achieve
social justice in several ways. Such land reform (1) grants financial security
and an improved standard of living to the land recipient, (2) politically
empowers the land recipient, (3) generates economic activity in rural areas,
and (4) provides a framework for equitable economic growth.
1. Grants Financial Security and Improved Standards of Living to Land
Recipients
Most farm labor contracts and tenancy agreements in developing
countries are tenuous at best.26 Thus the ownership rights to arable land that
farm laborers receive under land redistributions provide them with valuable
income security. 27  Although most land reform programs require
beneficiaries to pay back at least some portion of the value of the land, the
payments are lower than the rents paid under former tenancy arrangements.28
They are also generally fixed payments so that the profits from increased
production accrue entirely to the land recipient.29 Additionally, ownership
25 PUTZEL, supra note 3, at 4; see also TODARO, supra note 23, at 322. Because of the significant
economic, social, and political value associated with land ownership, providing small farmers with secure
property rights is widely seen "as a necessary first condition for agricultural development in many LDC's
[less developed countries]." Abhijit V. Banerjee, Land Reforms: Prospects and Strategies (1999),
available in The World Bank Group Land Policy Papers and Materials (visited June 15, 2000)
<http://www.worldbank.org/search.htm>; see also PROSTERMAN & HANSTAD, supra note 17, at 2-3. When
tenants with little security or agricultural laborers work the land for a landlord, they have little incentive to
make investments or improvements that might increase the land's productivity. However, farmers who
own their land have an expectation of future return and are, therefore, more likely to make investments in
capital, such as equipment purchases and "sweat-equity," or labor-intensive improvements to their land.
The expectation of realizing all of the profits from their land is likely to prompt owner-operators to use
higher quality seeds, fertilizers, and other tools than tenant-cultivators. Improvements, such as terracing,
land leveling, irrigation or drainage improvements, and tree planting can ensure environmental
sustainability and improve future productivity. JEFFREY M. RIEDINGER, AGRARIAN REFORM IN THE
PHILIPPINES: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS AND REDISTRIBUTIVE REFORM 79 (1995); see generally ROY L.
PROSTERMAN & JEFFREY M. RIEDINGER, LAND REFORM AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 35-71 (1987).
26 PRoSTERMAN & HANSTAD, supra note 17, at 1.
27 Id. at 2.
28 PROSTERMAN & RIEDINGER, supra note 25, at 200-01.
29 Id.
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of land enables beneficiary families to access credit markets for investments
in education and health care.
30
2. Politically Empowers Land Recipients
Redistribution of land politically empowers the land recipients. When
peasants acquire land through redistribution, their status and dignity in
society increases, thus empowering them to participate in the political
process on a local and national level. 3' Given the traditional political power
associated with land ownership, rural peasant interests may have a stronger
voice in the legislative process when their numbers include landowning
farmers.32
3. Generates Economic Activity in Rural Areas
As the beneficiaries of land redistribution establish their small farms,
they will be able to use their land as collateral to access credit.33 With this
credit, they will be able to purchase new equipment and make structural
improvements to their land.34 These small farmers are more likely to invest
and consume locally than their former landlords who mostly consume in
distant urban centers.35 Thus, redistributive land reform will lead to
increased markets for locally produced items, stimulating the non-
agricultural sectors of the rural economy.36 New job possibilities in the rural
areas will keep landless families, who would otherwise be forced to migrate
to urban areas in search of income, in their communities.
37
4. Provides a Framework for Equitable Economic Growth
The benefits of government investments in agricultural productivity
accrue mostly to current landowners, and thus propagate existing
30 Banejee, supra note 25, at 14. Access to credit markets may enable beneficiary families to
provide better health care and education for their children, which in turn could have a positive effect on
future production. Id.3 PROSTERMAN & HANSTAD, supra note 17, at 3.
32 SOBHAN, supra note 16, at 64-67.
33 Land Policy, supra note 14, at 4.
3 Id.
35 PROSTERMAN & HANSTAD, supra note 17, at 3.
36 Id.
31 Id. at 3-4.
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inequities. 38 Therefore, a benefit of redistributing agricultural land before
implementing intensive programs to increase agricultural productivity is that
peasant land recipients will derive greater benefit from those productivity
investments.39 This promotes efficiency and equit' as rural assets are more
broadly distributed among a country's population.
In summary, redistributive land reform helps achieve social justice by
reallocating valuable property to peasants.4' This helps alleviate rural
poverty by granting financial security and improved living standards to land
recipients, politically empowering land recipients, generating economic
activity in rural areas, and providing a framework for equitable economic
growth. Redistributive land reform thereby plays "a vital role in
empowerment, democratization, and the growth of civil society. '' 2
III. HISTORY OF LAND REFORM PROGRAMS IN THE PHILIPPINES
Land reform has historically been important to Philippine peasants
because so many of them have depended on tenant farming or plantation
labor for a living.43 Philippine peasants have consistently called for
redistribution of agricultural lands since the Spanish colonial period of the
19th century. 4 Control of political, economic, and social structures within
the Philippines has traditionally rested with a minority group of wealthy
landowners.4 5 Until 1935, colonial authorities responded to calls for land
reform by crafting programs filled with opportunities for evasion and
landowner resistance.46 The Filipino landowning elite that gained power
after the colonial authorities, and who hold power to this day, have
38 See James Riddell, Contemporary Thinking on Land Reform, available in SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (visited
Mar. 24,2000) <http://www.fao.org/WAICENTFAOINFO/SUSTDEV/LTdirectlLTanOO37.htm>.
39 Adelman & Robinson, supra note 15, at 984.
40 Id. at 991.
41 See Baneriee, supra note 25, at 34.
42 Tim Hanstad, Introduction to Rural Land Law Reform, in LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFECTIVE
RURAL LAND RELATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA 5 (Roy Prosterman & Tim Hanstad eds.,
World Bank Working Paper No. 436, 1999) [hereinafter World Bank Working Paper No. 436].
43 While the agricultural sector does not dominate the national economy as it once did (agriculture
makes up only 20% of the Gross Domestic Product), nearly 40% of Filipinos are still employed in the
agricultural sector. CIA-The World Factbook 1999-Philippines (visited June 15, 2000)
<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rp.html>.
44 PUTZEL, supra note 3, at 61; see generally Philippine Peasant Institute, 100 Years of Peasant
Struggle (visited Jan. 27, 2000) <http://www.ppi.org.ph/history/hist.main.htm>.
, PUTZEL, supra note 3, at 49.
4 See SAULO-ADRIANO, supra note 13, at 2-4.
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continued to roduce land reform programs full of opportunities for abuse by
landowners.
A. Brief Overview of Land Ownership in the Philippines
Before the Spanish established authority in 1571, there was very little
notion of private property in land in the Philippines.48 Under the Spanish
colonial state, the Catholic Church acquired much of the best agricultural
land and developed a significant presence in the rural areas.49 The Spanish
language became a tool by which local people from each region were shut
out of elite commerce and culture. 50 Both Church lands and private
agricultural plantations encroached on the lands of indigenous people despite
an agrarian revolt in 1745.51 When Church lands were leased out to farmers
in long-term leasehold arrangements, they were generally divided into large
pieces, effectively excluding local buyers.52 The extent of agricultural
policy of the Spanish authorities was to encourage production of export
crops such as tobacco on large plantations.53 The 1896 Revolution, which
overthrew the Spanish colonial authority, was a product of the combined
efforts of peasants and an emerging Filipino elite.m When the First
Philippine Republic was established in 1898, the Filipino elite quickly
gained control, enforcing the old land tenure system at the expense of
peasants.55  Similarly, after the Philippine-American War in which the
United States established colonial control, the Filipino elites united to form




48 PUTZEL, supra note 3, at 44.
49 Id. at 44-45.
so Id.
I Id. at 45.
5 Id. at 48-49.
53 Id. at 47-48.
54 Id. at 49-50.
55 Id.
'6 Id. at 51-53.
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B. Land Reform Programs Implemented Before CARP Failed to
Successfully Redistribute Land
Between 1898 and 1946, under the U.S. Colonial authority57 and the
Commonwealth government,58 control of the large and productive
agricultural lands in the Philippines gradually fell into the hands of an elite
minority of wealthy Filipinos. 59 While policy-makers were apparently
interested in implementing some programs to encourage more secure tenure
for peasants, their intentions were derailed in each case by actions taken by
local elites or poor legislative drafting. 60
When the Japanese occupied the Philippines 61 during World War II,
the Philippine peasants began to actively resist the landlords, most of whom
had allied with the Japanese.62 In an uprising known as the Huk Rebellion,63
peasant groups succeeded in controlling and temporarily redistributing
substantial portions of Central Luzon, a Philippine province with a
prosperous agricultural sector.6 The momentum of the Huk Rebellion led to
the election of Ramon Magsaysay as President in 1953 on promises of more
liberal land reform legislation. However, he significantly diluted his
57 For a description of U.S. Colonial authority see Philippine Peasant Institute, 100 Years of Peasant
Struggle (Page 3) (visited Jan. 27, 2000) available in <http://www.ppi.org.ph/history/hist 3.htm>;
Philippine Peasant Institute 100 Years of Peasant Struggle (Page 4) (visited Jan. 27, 2000) available in
<http://www.ppi.org.ph/history/ hist_4.htm>.
5s For a description of the Commonwealth government see Philippine Peasant Institute, 100 Years of
Peasant Struggle (Page 5) (visited Jan. 27, 2000) available in <http://www.ppi.org.ph/history/hist5.htm>;
Philippine Peasant Institute, 100 Years of Peasant Struggle (Page 6) (visited Jan. 27, 2000) available in
<http://www.ppi.org.ph/history/hist_6.htm>; Philippine Peasant Institute, 100 Years of Peasant Struggle
(Page 7) (visited Jan. 27, 2000) available in <http'//www.ppi.org.ph/history/hist_7.htm>.
59 PUTZEL, supra note 3, at 51-58.
60 Id. To pacify peasants opposed to U.S. rule, the colonial government enacted the Friar Lands Act
of 1904 to distribute lands previously held by the Catholic Church. However, few tenants could afford the
price offered by the government so the local elite or U.S. corporations finally purchased much of the land.
Id. at 53. Later, the Rice Share Tenancy Act of 1933 was passed in an attempt to regulate the increasingly
widespread tenancy arrangements in the agricultural sector. However, it granted control over the law's
implementation to local municipal council elites, many of who had previously profited from one-sided
tenancy agreements. Id. at 58-59.6 Id. at 59-60. Between early 1942 and late 1944 the Japanese occupied and controlled the
Philiplines. Id. at 59, 83.
Id. at 59-60.
REDINGER, supra note 25, at 48-55. The Hukbalahap (People's Anti-Japanese Army), known
simply as the Huks, was formed in March 1942 and fought to establish local peasant governments during
and after the war. The Huks' army grew to 10,000 soldiers at the height of their rebellion in the late
1940's. When American forces retook the country, they repressed the Huks because of their affiliation
with the communist party by arresting Huk soldiers and supporting private armies retained by landlords
who had come back to retake their lands, With prospects for non-violent struggle improving in the early
1950's, support for the militant group waned and the Huk commander surrendered in 1954. Id.
6 PUTZEL, supra note 3 at 60.
65 REDINGER, supra note 25, at 88.
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proposals after the election." As a result, the Land Reform Act of 195567
contained severe internal limitations on land redistribution, including a high
retention limit,68 a requirement that tenants on every redistributed farm
petition for expropriation,69 and insufficient funds to adequately acquire
land.70  In short, Magsaysay's land reform proved disappointing,
redistributing less than four-tenths of one percent of Philippine farmland in
six years.7'
In 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
27 ("PD 27").72 Under PD 27, any tenant living on a rice or corn farm
whose landlord had more than seven hectares of land was eligible to
purchase a piece of the land he had previously tilled." Despite the clear
redistributive theme of PD 27, actual land transfers were few and far
between during the Marcos years. 74 In fact, "reverse" land reform occurred
both when government policies allowed large plantations to overtake lands
of small food-crop farmers,75 ostensibly to increase national export-crop
production, and when landlords evicted tenants to evade redistribution under
PD 27.76 Landlords and multinational agribusiness corporations also
profited at the expense of tenants and laborers from other Marcos programs
66Id.
67 Land Reform Act (Republic Act No. 1400) (Phil.) (1955).
6g RIEDINGER, supra note 25, at 90. As originally drafted, lands in excess of 144 hectares would be
subject to reform, but the Act was amended to allow lands up to 300 hectares for private lands growing
rice, 600 hectares for corporate farms growing rice, and 1024 hectares for farms growing crops other than
rice. These amended retention limits meant that only two percent of agricultural land would be subject to
redistribution. Id.
6 The government could only expropriate land upon petition from a majority of the tenants working
that land. Id. at 91.
70 Id. Payment was to be in cash and the funds allocated for the project were much lower than had
been initially proposed. Id.
71 Approximately 20,000 hectares were acquired and redistributed. Id.
7 SAULO-ADRIANO, supra note 13, at 7-8. Presidential Decree No. 27 implemented Operation Land
Transfer and Operation Leasehold which are both land redistribution programs originally designed under
the 1963 Agricultural Land Reform Code ("RA 3844"). These programs, although riddled with loopholes
and pro-landowner amendments, planned for the transition of tenants to leaseholder and from leaseholders
to landowners. RA 3844 was limited to rice and corn farms and was also limited by the requirement that
regional administrative bodies be set up prior to its implementation. See Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972)
[hereinafter PD 27].
73 PD 27, supra note 72
74 RIEDINGER, supra note 25, at 97. Less than four percent of the country's cultivated lands were
redistributed by the early 1980's under the Marcos government; see also DAVID WURFEL, FILIPINO
POLITICS: DEVELOPMENT AND DECAY 174 (1988) (suggesting that by 1980 those deprived of land by
reverse land reform might have outnumbered beneficiaries that had received final title documents to land
under PD 27).
75 RIEDINGER, supra note 25, at 100.
76 YUJIRo HAYAMI, TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE LAND REFORM PARADIGM 7 (1990). Some landlords
planted crops other than rice and com, at the expense both of labor-intensive jobs and productivity, in order
to avoid land reform. Id.
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that were designed to attract investment and increase agricultural exports."
The ineffectiveness of PD 27 can be attributed to flawed drafting,78 a lack of
political will to improve the conditions of peasants, 79 and a failure to account
for the differences between the social and political conditions of the
Philippines and other Asian countries that had experienced more successful
land reforms.
80
Many peasants became angry at the ineffectiveness of PD 27 and
expressed their anger in what has become known as the People Power
Revolution, which brought President Corazon Aquino to power in 1986.8' A
more effective agrarian reform was chief among her promises to the Filipino
82peasants. Peasant organizations offered agrarian reform proposals that
were grudgingly accepted in principle by landowners, at least officially.83
However, Aquino decided not to use the legislative authority that she held
temporarily before the 1988 elections to introduce sweeping land reforms. 84
Instead, she decided to defer responsibility for agrarian reform to the elite-
dominated Congress, ostensibly in affirmation of the democratic process.85
In 1988, Congress passed the much-anticipated agrarian reform
legislation that implemented CARP. 6  Congress introduced the CARP
legislation with the intent to redistribute over ten million hectares of
7 See generally BATARA, supra note 4, at 11-16.
78 RIEDINGER, supra note 25, at 92-101. Design flaws in the 1972 program were numerous: (1)
excessive bureaucracy was required to process the different land surveys, claims, and ownership
documents; (2) peasants had to be members of community organizations that did not exist at the time the
law was written; (3) some observers criticized the retention limit as being too high and having too many
loopholes compared to other successful Asian land reforms such as Japan (zero retention), Taiwan (3)
hectares retention) and South Korea (zero retention); (4) the actual fact of ownership of land was in dispute
during the time that papers were processed, and thus peasants were forced to pay rent to landowners and
property taxes as landowners at the same time; and (5) landlords were free to bargain with tenants for the
price of the land and frequently overstated the compensation, effectively draining the already limited land
acquisition budget. Id.
79 Id. at 94. Evidence suggests that where President Marcos had political enemies, expropriation of
land was much more efficient. Id. Regional inconsistencies in implementing the reform program are
attributable to Marcos' primary agenda in adopting land reform: to punish wealthy landlords and to
suppress rural unrest. KEIJIRO OTsuKA, DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF LAND REFORM
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 349-50 (199 1).
so HAYAMI, supra note 76, at 2-3. Crisis situations and effective administrations created conditions
under which Japanese, South Korean and Taiwanese landlords were more willing to submit to land reform.
See also PROSTERMAN & HANSTAD, supra note 17, at 4-5. Land reform programs are more achievable
when certain conditions exist, including unified peasant support collaborating with strong governmental
authority, to create "windows of opportunity" in which landowners will be more willing to submit. Id.
s' RIEDINGER, supra note 25, at 105-06.
2 d.
3 Id. at 128. Landowners were fearful to speak out against the concept of land reform but based
their opposition on the specifics of the various proposals.
Id. at 176.
s5 Id.
"' RA 6657, supra note 5.
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Philippine agricultural land to tenants by 1998.87 Although CARP has
effected the most land redistribution in the country's history, it has neither
achieved its original objectives nor satisfied the hopes of the peasants.
88
C. CARP's Ambitious Goals and Purposes are Limited By Legislative
Provisions
CARP's stated purpose was to promote social justice, and its scope, in
terms of both hectares of land and numbers of beneficiaries, was much
greater than its predecessor, PD 27.89 According to the CARP legislation, all
land redistribution was to be completed by 1998.90 Nevertheless, peasant
groups criticized the Aquino administration for including provisions in the
legislation that allowed landowners, particularly owners of plantations and
large commercial farms, to temporarily or permanently evade
redistribution.9
1. The Main Purpose of CARP
According to Section 2 of the CARP legislation, the main purpose of
an agrarian reform implementing program such as CARP is "to promote
social justice" for landless farmers and farm workers and to prepare the
Philippines for future growth. 92 In its Declaration of Principles and Policies,
the CARP legislation focuses on land ownership as an important social
determinant in the Philippines. 93 CARP's purposes are to be achieved by "a
more equitable distribution" of all agricultural lands, subject to allowances
for some retention of land by current landowners, and the payment of just
compensation.94 However, in Section 3 of the legislation, the definition of
agrarian reform provides that either redistribution of land or profit-sharing
programs95 on larger farms will fulfill the requirements of CARP. 96 This
87 RIEDINGER, supra note 25, at 156; RA 6657, supra note 5, § 5.
88 BATARA, supra note 4, at 84.
89 SAuLO-ADRIANO, supra note 13, at 13-17.
90 RA 6657, supra note 5, § 5.
91 SAULO-ADRIANO, supra note 13, at 27.
9 RA 6657, supra note 5, § 2.
93 id.
94 Id.
95 Under profit sharing programs, instead of physically dividing up their land to their farm laborers,
commercial farms or large plantations were allowed to fulfill their requirements under CARP by giving
corporate shares to the workers. Id. § 31. Although the ownership of stock is certainly an asset to the farm
laborers, it is less valuable for gaining access to credit and long-term income security than physical
ownership of land. Id.
9 Id. § 3(a).
VOL. 9 No. 3
PHILIPPINE LAND REFORM
definition has drawn criticism because it seems to contradict the guiding
principles found in Section 2, which call exclusively for changes in land
ownership under CARP.97
2. The Scope of CARP Limits its Effectiveness
The scope of the planned redistribution under CARP includes
substantial public lands and all private lands that are suitable for agricultural
use.98  However, CARP's retention limit provision allows landowners to
keep five hectares of land and to give three hectares to each of his or her
children. 99 All owners of agricultural land had to register their property with
the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR") so that the DAR could make a
determination of which lands were subject to redistribution. 1°° The initial
target for land redistribution under CARP was 10.3 million hectares,
including 3.8 million hectares to be redistributed by the DAR and 6.5
million hectares by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
("DENR"). 1° 1 The total target was later reduced to 7.8 million hectares as a
result of various legislative, executive, administrative and judicial rulings
that amended or further limited CARP.10 2
Textual weaknesses in defining the scope of CARP reduce its capacity
to meet its stated purpose of affecting social justice through extensive land
redistribution, particularly in the private sector.10 3 First, the area covered by
CARP excludes a large portion of lands because they are used partially for
specific public purposes or are lands subject to retention limits and
agribusiness exceptions.' °4 Second, provisions permitting retention limits
and gifts to children allow certain owners of targeted lands to continue to
hold large farms.'0 5 Third, provisions favoring agribusinesses allow a ten-
year deferral of redistribution of commercial farms and stock distribution
9 PuTrzEL, supra note 3, at 272-73.
9 RA 6657, supra note 5, § 4.
" Id. § 6.
'o Id. § 14.
10 BATARA, supra note 4, at 25.
102 Id. at 25, tbl.l.
103 See SAULO-ADRIANO, supra note 13, at 19-23.
104 Id. at 19-21. The absolute bar on redistribution of lands used for non-profit purposes has allowed
some landowners to circumvent CARP by converting part of their property to public uses. For example,
TADECO, one of the largest banana plantations in the Philippines, is exempted from CARP because 4000
hectares of its lands are leased to the government for use as a prison. Id. at 19.
'o' Id. at 22.
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plans to substitute for physical redistribution of plantations, thereby
permitting agribusinesses to retain the vast majority of their land holdings.
06
3. The Mechanics of Land Acquisition Under CARP Limit its
Effectiveness
The Philippine government acquires private land under CARP when a
landowner receives formal notice from the DAR informing the landowner
that their land is subject to CARP redistribution. 10 7 This notice includes an
offer to purchase the land for a stated price.10 8 If the landowner refuses the
offer, administrative proceedings are instigated by the DAR to determine
just compensation.10 9 The courts have authority to subjectively consider ten
factors when determining just compensation." 0  Critics of CARP note that
although both the original purchase price of the land and tax valuations are
among the factors noted in CARP's valuation formula, landowners are not
required to submit documentation regarding these factors."' The complex
land valuation formula and the legal appeals allowed on the just
compensation issue allow landowners to delay redistribution by filling the
courts with excessive litigation. 112  Landowners have a right to appeal
compensation determinations to the Supreme Court, potentially creating long
delays in redistribution." 3
Upon assent by the landowner or a determination of just
compensation, the government pays the landowner and takes ownership of
the land.' 14 The landowner has the option to be paid in cash for at least
twenty-five percent of the purchase price of the land transferred." 5  The
'06 See RA 6657 supra note 5, §§ 8, 11, 13; PUTZEL, supra note 3, at 274-75; SAULO-ADRIANO, supra
note 13, at 22-23.
107 RA 6657, supra note 5, § 16(a).
1o8 Id.
'09 Id. § 16(d).
110 Id. § 17.
11 PUTZEL, supra note 3, at 273.
12 See id. at 26-27. Before the CARP legislation was passed, scholars were proposing more simple
compensation formulas that would have provided fewer opportunities for lengthy arguments about
compensation levels for individual pieces of land. See Tim Hanstad, Philippine Land Reform: The Just
Compensation Issue, 63 WASH. L. REv. 417,441-42 (1988).
113 RA 6657, supra note 5, §§ 16(0, 60; PUTZEL, supra note 3, at 273; Jeffrey M. Riedinger, Revising
CARP, Risking Reform? in THE MARKET-ASSISTED LAND REFORM (MALR) APPROACH: WHAT'S IN IT FOR
CARP? 3 (FARMS Harvest: Philippine Development Assistance Program 1999) [hereinafter Risking
Refor~t)'RA 6657, supra note 5, § 16(e).
"s RA 6657, supra note 5, § 18.
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remainder of the compensation is paid in the form of Land Bank of the
Philippines ("Landbank") bonds." 6
In summary, the Filipino peasant sector was bitterly disappointed at
the apparent concessions granted to the landowning class through the textual
weaknesses in the CARP legislation.' 17  One commentator stated, "[h]ow
CARP will sow social justice with a token scope is beyond anybody's
guess." 1 8 However, even more disappointing than the legislative text of
CARP was its implementation by the Aquino, Ramos, and Estrada
administrations.
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CARP
A. Implementation Under the Aquino Administration (1988-1992)
The pace of redistribution and the number of exemptions granted to
corporate agribusiness were the primary failings of CARP under Aquino.
Implementation was slowed by scandals that forced several leadership
changes in the DAR. 119 Many plantation owners followed the lead of
President Aquino's family, who maintained control of their lands by electing
to distribute stock to their tenants instead of physically redistributing the
land.120  The DAR was not prepared to, and in fact did not, make any
significant acquisitions of private lands.' 21 According to one DAR secretary
who held office during the Aquino administration, not one hectare of private
land had been expropriated after three years of CARP. 1
22
: 6 RA 6657, supra note 5, § 18.
' RIEDINGER, supra note 25, at 176.
Is BATARA, supra note 4, at 26.
19 BORRAS, supra note 7, at 45-47. Four different Secretaries worked at CARP implementation
between 1988 and 1992. Fraudulent real estate transactions within the Voluntary Sale portion of the CARP
forced the first resignation. Congress did not confirm the second Secretary because of political
controversies between parties. Congress did not confirm the third Secretary, a liberal reformer, because of
a pro-peasant stance he took on a land-use conversion petition. Many pro-reform DAR staff resigned after
this incident leaving a conservative agency for the remaining two years of the Aquino administration. Id.
120 SAULO-ADRIANO, supra note 13, at 53. Hacienda Luista, the sugar plantation owned by President
Aquino's family was the first corporation to be officially permitted to avoid redistribution of their lands by
taking advantage of CARP's stock distribution option. At the time, Hacienda Luista covered about 4200
hectares and employed approximately 6300 farm laborers. Id.
121 See BORRAs, supra note 7, at 47.
122 Id. at 45 n.29.
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B. Implementation Under the Ramos Administration (1992-1998)
The Ramos regime efficiently redistributed public lands and started
the process of expropriating private lands.12 3  Specifically, the Ramos
administration distributed more public land in five years (2.7 million
hectares) than had been distributed in the previous twenty years (1.9 million
hectares). 124 Table 1 summarizes land redistribution efforts between 1972
and 1998.
Table 1. Total Land Redistribution under PD 27 and CARP
Land Type Hectares Hectares Redistribution Percent
Redistributed: Redistributed: Goal (Hectares)1 2s Redistributed
1972-1986 1986-1998
PD 27 - DAR126  113,328 380,021 579,520 85
CARP - DAR 27  2,318,489 3,751,571 62
CARP -DENR 28  1,971,915 3,771,411 52
Total 113,328 4,670,425 8,102,502 58
The Ramos government also succeeded in collaborating with other
governmental and non-governmental agencies in administering CARP. For
example, DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao succeeded in establishing and
stabilizing connections between the DAR and the President's Office, and
between the DAR and peasant organizations. 129  Moreover, the Ramos
administration successfully renewed the CARP legislative mandate for ten
additional years. At the close of his term, Secretary Garilao worked with
peasant organizations to pass Republic Act No. 8532 (1998) ("RA 8532"),
which extended CARP through 2008.130 Although the money allocated by
123 See id. at 49.
124 id.
12 Id. at 141-43. The original scope of CARP was 10,295,600 hectares. Id. at 141, tbl.4.
126 Numbers in this row are compiled from SAULO-ADRIANo, supra note 13, at 49 tbl.10, and
BORRAS, supra note 7, at 142, tbl.5. Both authors denote land redistribution statistics under PD 27 by the
phrase "[tienanted rice and corn lands." Additionally, both authors cite DAR reports as being their original
source.
127 Because the DAR is responsible for redistributing lands under PD 27, (i.e. tenanted rice and corn
lands) as well as newly targeted lands under CARP, the amount of new land to be redistributed under
CARP has been calculated by taking the total accomplishment and scope figures recorded in Philippine
Peasant Institute, supra note 6, and subtracting the accomplishment and scope figures determined for PD
27.
128 Philippine Peasant Institute, supra note 6.
29 BoRRAs, supra note 7, at 48-49.
130 Id. at 69.
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RA 8532 was insufficient to fund the remaining land acquisition,' 31 the ten-
year extension was a victory for reformists who battled to save CARP.'
32
The most obvious failure of the Ramos administration was its inability
to redistribute a significant amount of the private land that was subject to
compulsory acquisition under CARP.' 33  Most of the lands redistributed
under Ramos were not private lands. 134 Only about 126,000 hectares, or two
percent of private lands targeted for compulsory acquisition were
expropriated. 35  These statistics led to skepticism among foreign and
domestic observers about the Philippine government's ability to accomplish
any significant land reform.
36
Further, the Agrarian Reform Community ("ARC") Program,
introduced by the Ramos administration, has harmed CARP beneficiaries by
diverting already limited resources away from land redistribution efforts. In
1993, the DAR introduced the ARC Program, which was intended to
complement the land reform efforts of CARP. 137 An ARC is a group of
farms where CARP beneficiaries are awaiting the full implementation of
land reform. ARCs receive government money for building support services
and infrastructure necessary for increases in productivity.' 38 The DAR has
touted the Program as a decentralized approach to implementation of an
integrated agrarian reform program. 139 However, ARCs use government
resources for agricultural support services that benefit established
landowners, when those resources could be used to directly benefit peasants
through land acquisition. Critics accused the government of showcasing a
few successful agrarian reform models to leverage foreign investment in the
agricultural sector at the expense of the rest of the rural areas.
140
131 Id. at 70. The 50 billion Philippine peso allocation, part of which is in doubt because of unreliable
sources of funds, does not come close to meeting the need estimated at 75 to 111 billion Philippine pesos.
Id. 12 Id. at71.
13 Id. at 142. As opposed to compulsory acquisition, approximately 400,000 hectares of private land
were targeted for voluntary redistribution. That is, landowners would voluntarily submit to CARP land
acquisition procedures. More than seventy-five percent of this target was achieved by 1997. The
remaining private lands targeted by CARP were to be acquired by compulsory acquisition (approximately
three million hectares). Id.
'34 Id. at 23.
135 id.
136 See generally BATARA, supra note 4, at 84; HAYAMI, supra note 80, at 4.
37 BORRAS, supra note 7, at 66.
1 Horacio Morales, Land Bank and DAR: A Partnership for Growth with Equity, Speech delivered
during the National Planning Workshop of the Land Bank of the Philippine (Nov. 21, 1998) available in
<http://www.skyinet.net/.-depagref/hrm-lbp.htm> [hereinafter Land Bank Speech].
139 Horacio Morales, Aflerword, in BoRRAs, supra note 7, at 196.
140 Noel Valencia, Preliminary Assessment of CARP, in VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS: REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAND USE CONVERSION AND AGRARIAN REFORM 52 (1994).
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C. Implementation Under the Estrada Administration (1998-present)
The current administration, particularly through DAR Secretary
Horacio Morales,'41 has indicated its dedication to continue the momentum
built by the limited land reform successes of the Ramos administration. The
administration under President Joseph Estrada announced ambitious goals
for land redistribution 142  and began preparing for the anticipated
administrative difficulties of redistributing the remaining CARP lands. 143
However, the administration's recent commitment to increasing foreign
investment in agriculture has created concern among some land reform
advocates. 144 Further obstacles to swift and extensive land redistribution
include continuing landowner resistance to redistribution, a lack of
collaboration between peasant groups, judicial action taken to reverse prior
CARP land allocations, and global trends towards neoliberalism.
1. Landowner Resistance to Redistribution
In 1999, President Estrada committed to completing the remaining
CARP land reform by 2004 by transferring an average of 250,000 hectares
of private land through the DAR each year. 145  The approximately 1.43
million hectares still to be acquired and redistributed by the DAR 146 are
almost entirely private lands subject to compulsory acquisition. 47 One main
obstacle to achieving this goal is continued landlord resistance to
141 Horacio Morales was once an economist for the Marcos administration before quitting his job to
join the grassroots communist movement. He was later imprisoned and tortured for his revolutionary
activities. Antonio Lopez Manila, Watch Out, Landowners; An Ex-communist Is Taking On Agrarian
Reform, NATIONS, July 17, 1998, at 26.
.42 See Philippines to Step Up Land Reform Effort, AFX News, Apr. 15, 1999, available in 1999 WL
14938640 [hereinafter Philippines to Step Up Land Reform Effort].
143 Senate Body OK's Agrarian Reform Bill, Bus. WORLD (Manila), July 6, 1999, available in 1999
WL 17717599 [hereinafter Senate Bill].
1'4 Frasisco Pascual, Jr., Current Trends in the Agrarian Front, in VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS:
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAND USE CONVERSION AND AGRARIAN REFORM 18-22
(1994).
143 Philippines to Step Up Land Reform Effort, supra note 142. The president set a target of
budgeting 9 billion Philippine pesos annually to agrarian reform over the next five years. The Philippine
government claims that 3.2 million hectares remain to be redistributed between 1998 and 2004, which
equals about 530,000 hectares per year. In the first 10 years of CARP, approximately 400,000 hectares per
year were redistributed. Philippine Leader Asks Congress to Finance Completion of Land Reform,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, June 15, 1999, available in Global News Bank <http://infoweb9.newsbank
.cor>.
46 See supra Part IV.B., tbl.1.
47 BORRAs, supra note 7, at 142. As of June 1997, 1.34 million hectares of private land subject to
compulsory acquisition remained. Id.
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redistribution. 148 Although many of the CARP lands had been targeted for
expropriation under previous administrations, 149 little progress has been
made in actually transferring ownership of these estates to beneficiaries. 50
Landowners have slowed the land transfers in several ways. First, physical
harassment of potential beneficiaries of expropriated commercial farms by
former landowners has interfered with CARP implementation in some
areas.' 51  Second, the widespread practice of land use conversions by
landowners, often with the assistance of local DAR officials, has interfered
with redistribution. 152  Since CARP applies only to agricultural lands, an
incentive exists for agricultural landowners to convert their land to industrial
or commercial uses. 153  Land use conversion has occurred legally through
the DAR 154 and illegally through bribery or coercion of local government
officials. 155  Particularly in Regional Industrial Centers ("RICs'"), I56 both
legal and illegal conversions are rampant as landlords use their formerly
"' Susan Berfield, Promised Land, ASIAWEEK, Oct. 23, 1998, at 39. Opponents of land reform have
gone so far as to threaten the families of government officials. Secretary Morales' seventeen-year-old
daughter was kidnapped in 1998 and was subsequently returned with a warning to stop giving valuable land
away to poor farmers. Id.
149 See BORRAS, supra note 7, at 42. CARP implementation was organized into three phases. Phase
I, to be implemented between 1988 and 1992 was to complete Operation Land Transfer, distribute idle and
abandoned lands, and lands voluntarily offered for sale. Phase H, also to be implemented between 1988
and 1992, was to redistribute public lands and all private lands larger than 50 hectares. Phase IIIA, to be
implemented between 1992 and 1995, was to implement private lands between 24 and 50 hectares. Phase
IIIB, to be implemented between 1994 and 1998, was to cover private lands smaller than 24 hectares. Id.
For details of the precise number of hectares and beneficiaries to be assisted in each implementation phase,
see Riedinger, supra note 25, at 156.
50 BoRRAs, supra note 7, at 142, noting that only nine percent of private lands subject to compulsory
acquisition was distributed.
'5' Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform & Rural Development, Agrarian Reform in the
Philippines. 1997, available in Sustainable Development Department, Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations Website (visited June 15, 2000) <http://www.fao.org/sd/ltdirect/lItan0O21.htm>
[hereinafter ANGOC]. In one example, after farmers had been issued certificates of land ownership, a
sugar plantation's owners hired a private army, with the permission of the town's mayor, to prevent farmers
from harvesting their crops. The farmers also claim to have been harassed and threatened personally. Id.
152 Valencia, supra note 140, at 37. Peasant farmers have held public demonstrations to display their
anger over land use conversions. Rice Planted on Golf Course in Protest, SEATTLE P-I, Jun. 11, 1998,
available in University of Washington Libraries, Washington State Newsstand <http://proquest.umi.coml
pqdweb>.
153 SAULO-ADRIANO, supra note 13, at 57.
154 BATARA, supra note 4, at 64. According to the Philippine Peasant Institute, 160,247 hectares of
agricultural land were converted or targeted for conversion by application to the DAR between 1988 and
1994. In addition to this land, large pieces of agricultural land near cities and towns was allowed to be
reclassified as non-agricultural in a unilateral decision by local governments under The Local Government
Code of 1991. Antonio Ma Nieva, Land Scam: Agrarian 'Reform,' Ramos Style, MULTINAT'L MONITOR,
Jan-Feb, 1994, available in University of Washington Expanded Academic Index (visited Aug. 21, 2000)
<http://web7.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark>.
155 Valencia, supra note 140, at 38.
56 Pascual, Jr., supra note 144, at 19. RICs are areas where government money will be targeted to
assist industrialization through infrastructure and industrial facilities. Id.
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agricultural land to embark on industrial enterprises in order to take
advantage of government investment in industrial support services. 5 7 Third,
landowners with lands subject to CARP are demanding higher compensation
rates to increase their personal profit from CARP transactions 58 although on
average, CARP compensation rates exceed estimated market prices.159
Finally, the DAR has worked against redistribution by canceling or
confiscating many previously granted temporary ownership documents.' 6
0
DAR Secretary Horacio Morales has admitted that redistributing lands
less than twenty-four hectares will prove even more difficult than the
redistribution of larger lands. 161  First, because of the smaller size of the
farms, the DAR must deal with more landowners for each block of land than
it has in the past, increasing the potential for administrative delays.
162
Second, many of these landlords live in areas where they are able to exert
negative political pressure on local DAR officials. 163  Third, there is less
societal agreement that redistributing these smaller farms is necessary for the
agricultural productivity increases normally associated with land
redistribution. 64
For these reasons, Morales has spearheaded an effort to reduce the
current backlog of CARP cases by reforming the body responsible for
adjudicating land reform disputes.' 5 Additionally, President Estrada has
asked the Philippine Congress for increased budget allocations to fund
increased administrative support and land acquisition. 1
66
117 Id. at 16.
158 Court Valuation Standards to Help Facilitate Agrarian Reform Program, BUS. WORLD (Manila),
July 6, 1999, available in 1999 WL 17717602.
'59 See generally RIEDINGER supra note 25, at 179 n.7.
160 See BATARA, supra note 4, at 62.
161 Horacio R. Morales, Opening Policy Knowledge to Social Participation: Agrarian Reform in the
Philippines, Paper delivered at Global Development Network conference (Dec. 5-8, 1999)
<http://orion.forumone.com/gdnet/files.fcgi/327_Morales.PDF>.
162 Land Bank Speech, supra note 138.
163 See BoRRAs, supra note 7, at 86-87. In the Southern Luzon region of Bicol, a local government
official has publicly claimed that there are no more lands to redistribute in his region, even though less than
40% of targeted CARP lands have in fact been redistributed in Bicol. The example of one landlord and his
attempts to evade redistribution under CARP demonstrates that landlords can coerce local officials to rule
unjustly in their favor in adjudicating peasant complaints. Id.; Lopez, supra note 141.
1' Weekender: A Time for Rethinking (Agrarian Reform), Bus. WORLD, June 11, 1999, available in
1999 WL 17716166 (since many of the owners of lands under 24 hectares are local professionals, and often
invest in technology for their farms, the Philippine government should exempt lands below 24 hectares
from CARP and begin to focus on other social issues).
165 Senate Bill, supra note 143.
'6 See generally Philippine Leader Asks Congress to Finance Completion of Land Reform, supra
note 145.
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2. Battling the National Budget: The Lack of Collaboration Between
Peasant Groups has Eroded Support for CARP Funding
Instead of increasing allocations for land reform, the latest national
budget allocations by the Philippine Congress dispensed a "crippling blow"
to CARP land acquisition and redistribution. 167  DAR Secretary Horacio
Morales stated that the cuts could mean the "complete cessation of the major
land acquisition and distribution activities of the DAR.', 168  Landbank' 69
officials threatened that the recent budget cuts could force the suspension of
new land transfers in order to service existing bonds, and could also cause
the Philippines to default on World Bank loans. 1
70
The recent budget cuts may be evidence that the political forces in
favor of extensive land redistribution have weakened. Scholars have linked
the success of land reform programs to active political advocacy.' 71  The
active "pro-CARP" collaborations that existed in the early 1990s between
grassroots peasant organizations eroded in the late 1990s.lt2 Thus, the lack
of collaboration among peasant organizations could pose a serious threat to
future redistribution efforts.1
7 3
167 DAR Budget Cut To Cripple Agrarian Reform-Morales, BUS. WORLD (Manila), Dec. 15, 1999.
available in 1999 WL 29170500 [hereinafter Budget Cuts]. The DAR's most recent budget proposal of
12.6 billion Philippine pesos was cut by 4.6 billion. Most notably, 1.2 billion Philippine pesos was cut
from the 1.8 billion originally targeted for the Agrarian Reform Fund, which covers landowner
compensation through the Landbank. Even the 12.6 billion Philippine pesos proposed was substantially
under the budget requirements published by the DAR. Philippine Peasant Institute, Summary of CARP
Budgetary Requirements for 1999 to 2004 for All Agencies Involved (visited Mar. 20, 2000)
<http://www.ppi.org.ph/programs/research/farm-charts/chart3.htm>.
:" Budget Cuts, supra note 167.
69 The Landbank of the Philippines provides mortgages to land recipients, and issues bonds as
compensation, to landowners whose land has been redistributed. SAULO-ADRIANO, supra note 13, at 18.
170 Reena J. Villamor, Landbank Risks Defaulting on World Bank Debts, Bus. WORLD (Manila), Jan.
10, 1999, available in 2000 WL 4647077.
171 HAYAMI et al., supra note 76, at 4. "...[T]he success of the new land reform program in the
Philippines (and in any other country) will depend on whether or not it has been designed with the political
market reality in the country in mind." Id.
'72 E-mail correspondence from Jeffrey M. Riedinger, Professor, Michigan State University, to Andre
Sawchenko, Comment Author, Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal (May 21, 2000) (on file with the
author). Peasant organizations are currently not as united as they were several years ago as a result of a
disagreement about how much involvement each organization should have with the Estrada Administration.
ld.
173 PUTZEL, supra note 3, at 363. United involvement of grassroots organizations will be necessary
for future successes in land reform. Id.
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3. The Estrada Administration's Commitment to Foreign Investment in
Agriculture is an Obstacle to CARP Redistribution
The Estrada administration recently cast doubt on the sincerity of its
commitment to extensive land redistribution by announcing plans to increase
foreign investment in agriculture. 74 The administration intends to achieve
the dual objectives of increased investment in agriculture and redistributive
land reform through a program entitled Convergence Strategy for
Sustainable Rural Development. 175 This program involves increased
collaboration between the DAR, the Department of Agriculture ("DA"), and
the DENR in specified "convergence zones." 176 The administration hopes to
attract private investment in the model agribusinesses within these
convergence zones. 77 To the displeasure of peasant organizations, a large
portion of CARP funds have already been spent on other similar investment-
inducing projects, such as the ARCs, to encourage foreign investment in
agribusiness, and the production of non-traditional crops.178  Recent
demonstrations by farmers have sent the message that peasants are
concemed about the increase in production of cash crops and the increase in
foreign ownership of land. 79  In short, peasant organizations fear that the
programs currently in place to attract foreign investment will perpetuate
power imbalances in the rural areas and will thereby work against the
DAR's commitment to swiftly expropriate private lands under CARP.'8 0
174 Land Bank Speech, supra note 138. Some peasants feel that the government is overlooking
current abuses of CARP by large corporations in order to attract more foreign investment. Attempts at
striking, organized by Dole corporation workers to increase the bargaining power of CARP-created worker
cooperatives, were crushed by armed forces, killing several workers. The Philippine government took no
action against the company. David Bacon, Banana War in the Philippines-Dole Strike Highlights Impact
of Corporate Globalization, Institute for Food and Development Backgrounder, Summer 1998, available in
Food First Website (visited May 9, 2000) <http://www.foodfirst.org/pubs/backgrdrs/1998/s98v5n2.htl>.
:75 Land Bank Speech, supra note 138.
176 Horacio Morales, Serving the Countryside Better, Speech delivered Jan. 26, 1999, available in
<http://www.skyinet.net/-depagref/hrm-jmc.htm>. Convergence zones are geographic areas that showcase
economically viable agribusinesses that are assisted by the coordinated efforts of various government
branches. Id.
177 Id.
:78 BATARA, supra note 4, at 72.
79 Teddy Casino, Fast Forward: Farmers' Turn to Rally, BUs.WORLD (Manila) Oct. 22, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 29167682.
1so See PASCUAL JR., supra note 144, at 19. For example, some worry that the Medium-Term
Philippine Development Plan, which was implemented to industrialize the Philippines, will simply
maintain current power imbalances. See id.
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4. Judicial Action has Impeded Effective Redistribution under CARP
The Philippine judiciary has earned an anti-reform reputation through
a series of decisions that provide ways for landowners to evade CARP. '8
Specifically, the judiciary has consistently construed the provisions defining
the scope of CARP narrowly while construing rights of landowners vis-i-vis
peasants broadly. In Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 8 2 the
Philippine Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the provision in the
CARP legislation that included livestock production lands in CARP
redistribution. In Central Mindanao University v. Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board,183 the Court construed broadly a provision in
the legislation that excludes lands being used for certain public purposes. In
short, the Philippine Supreme Court has invalidated and narrowly construed
the land acquisition provisions, while broadly defining the exceptions to land
redistribution. 184
5. Neoliberalism in the Philippines is an Obstacle to Redistribution
Under CARP
The "neoliberalist" economic reforms urged by foreign scholars and
influential international organizations 8 5 would hinder equitable land
redistribution to Philippine peasants. Neoliberalist theory suggests that
freeing international and domestic markets from over-regulation will
eventually achieve the greatest economic benefit to citizens of all countries
by increasing overall economic activity. 8 6 Further, neoliberalists suggest
that social and political transitions within a country should occur by a
process of "elite-pacting" whereby groups currently in power maintain a
large degree of control over social and political institutions and private
18' Valencia, supra note 140, at 40-44. For example, in Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines v. DAR, 175 Philippine Supreme Court Reports, Annotated 343 (1989), the Supreme Court
held that the government gains title to CARP lands only after landowners have been fully compensated,
which allows landowners time to use illegal means to dissuade beneficiaries from taking possession of the
land. Id.
..2 192 Philippine Supreme Court Reports, Annotated 51 (1990), cited in Valencia, supra note 140, at
41.
183 215 Philippine Supreme Court Reports, Annotated 86 (1992), cited in Valencia, supra note 140, at
42.
"u See generally Valencia, supra note 140, at 40-44.
83 BORRAS, supra note 7, at 3-5; PASCUAL, JR., supra note 144.
'" See Riddell, supra note 38, at 3.
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property. 18 7  The influence of neoliberalism can be seen in many current
administrative and legislative policies in the Philippines.'" Neoliberalism
poses a threat to extensive land redistribution under traditional land reforms
like CARP because of its emphasis on unrestricted markets and the
protection of established property ownership. 8 9  In other words, if the
Philippine government continues to embrace neoliberalism, its resolve to
redistribute land under CARP may eventually erode.
In summary, the DAR has publicly committed to accelerating
redistribution for the remaining CARP lands.' 90  However, in light of the
limited success redistributing private lands under the Aquino and Ramos
administrations, the DAR's new goals seem implausible. Thus, DAR
officials are currently evaluating proposals to revise the land redistribution
mechanism of CARP.' 9' The DAR has commissioned a study assessing the
feasibility of market-assisted land redistribution as a potential alternative to
the present, mandatory mode of land redistribution.1 92  Part V of this
Comment discusses potential land redistribution options and Part VI argues
in favor of mandatory redistribution.
V. MARKET-AsSISTED AND MANDATORY LAND REDISTRIBUTION: Two
POTENTIAL ALLOCATION MECHANISMS FOR CARP
The appropriate mechanism by which land should be redistributed in
the Philippines is in dispute among land reform scholars. 193  Two main
mechanisms of redistribution exist: mandatory redistribution and market-
assisted redistribution. 94 Mandatory redistribution is based on government
expropriation of private land, and is the mechanism that has traditionally
been used in land reforms throughout the world.' 95 Both PD 27 and CARP
187 Richard Levin & Daniel Weiner, The Politics of Land Reform in South Africa after Apartheid:
Perspectives, Problems, Prospects, in THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 94 (Henry Bernstein
ed., 1996).
188 See PASCUAL, JR., supra note 144, at 19. For example, the Medium-Term Philippine
Development Plan promises significant government resources to assist with increased production of export
crops and investments in industrialization. These government investments solidify the past inequalities
between the elite sector and the peasant sector since the government and foreign investment in these
projects are targeted to larger corporations. Id.
:9 BORRAS, supra note 7, at 2.
90 Philippines to Step Up Land Reform Effort, supra note 142.
191 Feasibility Study, supra note 8; WB, Taiwan Institute Assisting in Philippine Land Reform, ASIA
PULSE, Feb. 10, 1999, available in 1999 WL 5084589 [hereinafter WB, Taiwan Institute Assisting]
192 See Feasibility Study, supra note 8.
193 Risking Reform, supra note 113.
94 Riddell, supra note 38.
195 Id.
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have attempted to use the mandatory redistribution mechanism of the
"traditional land reform model" to acquire private land and subsequently
distribute it to landless Filipinos.196  With market-assisted redistribution,
land transfers occur through negotiated sales between landowners and
recipients.197
A. Mandatory Redistribution: The Traditional Land Reform Model
Based on past successful land reform efforts, 198 scholars have noted
several essential elements of traditional land reform programs: (1)
mandatory acquisition of private lands for redistribution cannot be replaced
with voluntary sale or resettlement strategies; 199 (2) retention limits for
landowners should be zero or very low, particularly where the land is
inhabited by tenants or is densely populated;20 (3) reasonable compensation
must be provided to landowners to maintain political stability;20' (4) the land
allocated to beneficiaries should be large enough to allow all (or nearly all)
potential beneficiaries to receive a share of the land, but it should not be too
large to be intensely farmed by a family;202 (5) the government should
provide only a minimum amount of additional services to land recipients in
order to focus resources on land acquisition;2°3 (6) land recipients should not
be forced to repay the full cost of the land acquisition;2°4 (7) the government
must ensure that administration of the redistribution program is relatively
simple in order to maximize resources; 205 and (8) land recipients must have
significant representation in the local land distributing authority.20 6
96 PD 27, supra note 72; RA 6657, supra note 5.
97 World Bank Group, The Theory Behind Market-Assisted Land Reform (visited May 11, 2000)
<http://worldbank.org/search.htm> [hereinafter World Bank Theory].
198 HAYAMI, supra note 76, at 1-3. Although used extensively throughout the world over the past 50
years, mandatory redistribution was most successfully applied in the land reforms of Japan, Taiwan, and
South Korea shortly after World War I. Id.
199 PROSTERMAN & HANSTAD, supra note 17, at 7.
200 Id. at 7-8.
201 Id. at 8. Compensation need not be full market value and may be substantially less, so long as the
payment provides cash flow is at least substantially comparable to that produced formerly by the land. Id.02 Id. One acceptable form of ensuring maximum benefit of the land reform effort is to divide the
amount of land available by the number of landless families. Id.
203 id.
204 Banerjee, supra note 25, at 26-27. Efficiency and living standard gains are likely to be limited to
the extent that beneficiaries' financial positions change. If large amortization payments are required,
beneficiaries will have had little accession to financial freedom from their previous position in most cases.
Id.
205 PROSTERMAN & RIEDINGER, supra note 25, at 179-89.
206 id.
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Other issues that must be considered when distributing land with a
mandatory redistribution mechanism include how to regulate resale of
redistributed lands, how to regulate land rental and evictions, how to target
the land to be redistributed, and whether to exempt certain types of farms.
20 7
B. Market-Assisted Redistribution
1. Rationale for Introducing Market-Assisted Redistribution
The most successful land reforms have been traditional programs that
used a mandatory redistribution mechanism, and they often occurred during
periods of political instability. 208  In these situations, authoritarian
governments have been able to forcibly remove property from wealthy
landowners. 20 9 Based on this history, some scholars question the feasibility
of mandatory redistribution in a full democracy. In particular, scholars have
begun to question the contemporary applicability of the traditional land
reform model in many developing countries where governments cannot
afford expensive social programs, and where peace, industrialization, and
foreign investment are seen as more important than shifting the power
balances within the country.1
The high cost of administering a mandatory land reform program, in
addition to compensating former landowners for expropriated land, has
made nation-wide, compulsory land reforms difficult in many countries.2 '
Further, according to some scholars and government officials, broad
expropriations combined with regulatory measures outlawing non-
agricultural land use have had a negative effect on land markets, foreign
investment in agriculture, and agricultural sector performance.2 12  Finally,
207 See Banerjee, supra note 25, at 19-26.
208 Riddell, supra note 38, at 5-6.
209 HAYAMI, supra note 76, at 2-3.
210 See World Bank Theory, supra note 197; BORRAS, supra note 7, at 1-5; Initial Experience, supra
note 9, at 3-7.
211 Initial Experience, supra note 9, at 7. Although compensating landlords can have the effect of
reducing resistance by the powerful elite class to the land reform effort, the costs can reduce the
effectiveness and scope of programs. Banerjee, supra note 30, at 26-27. The costs of traditional land
reform programs become particularly prohibitive when targeting large plantations, such as those in the
Philippines. HAYAMI, supra note 76, at 167.
2 Deininger et al., Implementing 'Market-friendly' Land Redistribution in South Africa: Lessons
from the First Five Years, at 13, available in Global Development Network, GDN99 Conference Papers
(visited June 20, 2000) <http://orion.forumone.com/gdnet/files.fcgi/224_zafpapv9.PDF> [hereinafter
Deininger South Africa].
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the land recipient selection process 213 used in some of the countries that have
a traditional land reform program has reduced access to land for farm
laborers.
214
Because of these perceived deficiencies in the traditional land reform
model, a new model of redistributive land reform was sought that would
keep the land market intact for landless laborers, corporate investors, and
industrialists.215 Some scholars, including those at the World Bank, propose
market-assisted land redistribution to address these concerns. 216
2. The Basic Theory of Market-Assisted Land Redistribution
The fundamental premise of market-assisted land redistribution is that
landowners and landless peasants enter into willing-buyer, willing-seller
agreements to transfer land.217 Purchases by peasants are subsidized by
grants given from funds raised from both public and private sources.218 The
government, non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"), 219  and land
recipients all have specific roles in market assisted land redistribution. The
government's role is to establish policies that will encourage a more active
land sales market, to develop model farm projects, and to provide land
purchase grants to land recipients. 220 The basic role of the NGOs is to work
213 Under CARP, priority in the selection of CARP land recipients is given to local landless residents
(as opposed to landless residents from other regions) and to tenants of the land over farm workers. RA
6657, supra note 5.
214 Deininger et al., Agrarian Reform in the Philippines: Past Impact and Future Challenges,
available in Global Development Network, GDN99 Conference Papers, at 24 (visited June 20, 2000)
<http://orion.forumone.com/gdnet/files.fcgi/189 final4.PDF> [hereinafter Deininger Philippines].213 Initial Experience, supra note 9, at 2-3.216 World Bank Theory, supra note 197. A Manual for Monitoring and Evaluation of Market Assisted
Land Reform is currently being developed by World Bank scholars. Id.
217 id.
218 Id.
219 In the Philippines, NGOs that could work with the DAR in implementing land reform are local
non-profit organizations formed to benefit peasants in one or more specific ways. For example, an NGO
might provide entrepreneurial training to beneficiaries and evaluate the agricultural efficiency of CARP
beneficiaries. See Land Policy, supra note 14, at 27.
220 Id. at 26-27. Pre-conditions to market-assisted land reform include eliminating policy distortions
and administrative restrictions on land sales and rental markets. Model farm projects include information
on finding employment for all family members, crop selection, and the creation of family-sized garden
plots. See Coralie Bryant, Property Rights for the Rural Poor: The Challenge of the Landless, J.INT'L
AFFAIRS, Fall 1998, at 198-204. To prepare for market-assisted land reform, the government must ensure
the following institutional conditions: (1) an open titling and registration process, (2) transparency and open
price competition; (3) credit, collateral and debt collection institutions; (4) freedom to contract and contract
enforceability; (5) dispute adjudication institutions; and (6) financing and extension for low income
cultivators. Id.
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at the local level to evaluate the potential demand and supply of land. 221 If
the land supply in a given area does not substantially exceed the demand,
land purchase grants will not be offered in that area.222 Potential land
recipients are responsible for grant proposals and for using the government
grant to secure land and other assets.223 Variations on this basic model exist
and have been applied with limited success in Colombia, Brazil, and South
Africa.
3. Market-Assisted Land Redistribution in Colombia, Brazil, and South
Africa
In 1994, Colombia implemented a market-assisted approach to land
redistribution in an attempt to reign in the ballooning cost of administering
its traditional land reform program. 224  The market-assisted approach
initially delivered disappointing results.225  Government officials have now
shifted the goal of the market-assisted program from redistributing a
specified amount of land to ensuring the viability of businesses established
on previous land transfers. 226 There has not been an adequate opportunity to
determine whether the changes have improved the effectiveness of
Colombia's market-assisted land reform.227
The Brazilian government has authorized pilot market-assisted land
reform programs in northeastern Brazil in an attempt to provide more
efficient and cost-effective land reform.228 Over the past thirty years,
Brazil's land reform programs have proven expensive and inefficient.229
State governments are currently experimenting with decentralized, market-
221 Land Policy, supra note 14, at 27. To evaluate the demand for land, local organizations must raise
awareness among potential beneficiaries, quantify the number and need of the beneficiary population, and
work to develop a transparent process of dealing with potential beneficiaries. To evaluate the supply of
land, NGOs determine which land, reasonably priced and suitable for cultivation as a small farm, will likely
be offered for sale in the near future. Id.
222 Id. at 27 n.14. If the supply of land does not exceed demand in a local area, the sellers will have
the bargaining advantage and prices will not be competitive, making market-assisted land reform
impracticable in that area. Id.
223 Id. at 27.
224 Initial Experience, supra note 9, at 8-9.
221 Id. at 9.
226 Id. at 10. Several substantive changes were made to apply this new focus. First, administering the
land reform was further decentralized. Second, additional technical support was provided for beneficiaries.
Id.
227 See id. at 28.
228 Id. at 22
n Id.
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assisted programs in the northeast.230  Sufficient evidence of whether the
pilot projects were successful has not yet been gathered.23'
Land reform in South Africa was designed as a part of a broader plan
to correct the injustices done to indigenous South Africans during their
eighty years under the apartheid system of government.232 Under the South
African land reform program, rural households could receive a grant to aid
in the purchases of land and capital in the regular markets.233 However,
during the first five years of implementation, the land reform program
delivered disappointing results.234
4. The Philippine Market-Assisted Land Redistribution Proposal
Since 1997, foreign observers such as the World Bank have been
proposing that the Philippines adopt a new model of land reform for the
remaining CARP lands.2  They propose that the new program include the
basic elements of market-assisted land reform in addition to two unique
elements that are particularly tailored to land reform in the Philippines.236
First, their proposal suggests an elimination of the CARP restrictions on land
rental arrangements to allow for basic access to land for those who cannot
acquire their own land.237 Second, it suggests that local land taxes should be
more effectively collected.238 In theory, effective tax collection would act as
an incentive for owners to use their land productively. 239 The additional
2" See The World Bank Group, World Bank Supports Pilot Land Reform in Brazil, News Release No.
97/1321, Apr. 22, 1997, available in (visited Feb. 28, 2000) <http:l/www.worldbank.org/html/extdrl
extme/1321.htm>. A $90 million external loan helped to fund these market-assisted projects. Id.231 Initial Experience, supra note 9, at 22. Early evidence suggests that very few Brazilian
beneficiaries have been able to repay their land purchase credits and so they have not been able to receive
final title. This has raised concerns about the ability of beneficiaries to access working capital without
further grant funding. Id.
232 Deininger South Africa, supra note 212, at 2-3. As a part of South Africa's Reconstruction and
Development Program, market-assisted land reform was chosen as a compromise with the wealthy, white
minority and foreign investors who wanted assurances that the New South Africa would respect privateproperty rights. Id.W., See id. at 12-18.
2m Between 1994 and 1999, only 0.6% of the targeted lands (about 200,000 out of 29.72 million
hectares) were redistributed and only two percent of households demanding land (about 20,000 households)
were served. Id. at 12.
235 U.S. Scholar to WB: Market Based CARP Not Fit for RP, Bus. DAILY, July 30, 1997, available in
1997 WL 12007020.
2 See Deininger Philippines, supra note 214, at 22-24.
237 Id. at 22.
238 Id. at 4.
239 Id. at 23.
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revenue generated would purportedly fund the market-assisted land reform
program and provide grants to land recipients.
24
Advocates of this new model have traveled to the Philippines to meet
with DAR Secretary Morales to convince him of its benefits.24' While the
Philippine government initially rebuffed this proposal, 242 current DAR
officials have commissioned a study to further investigate market-assisted
land reform.
243
VI. LAND REFORM IN THE PHILIPPINES SHOULD OCCUR BY MANDATORY
REDISTRIBUTION
Mandatory redistribution is the best land reallocation mechanism for
the Philippines because it is likely to provide the best opportunity for the
redistribution of the most land to the most beneficiaries. A land
redistribution mechanism should further the purposes of that country's
overall agrarian reform program.244 According to CARP, the primary
purpose of agrarian reform in the Philippines is to effect social justice in the
rural areas, including the establishment of a social and economic framework
conducive to equitable economic growth. 245 Thus, the land redistribution
mechanism of the traditional land reform model is preferable because it has
the capacity to effect social justice by redistributing more land.246
A. Mandatory Redistribution is the Most Effective Land Reform
Mechanism for Achieving Social Justice in the Philippines
Mandatory redistribution of land has already benefited, and will
continue to benefit, rural Filipinos in two ways. First, government
acquisition and redistribution of land is a very efficient redistribution
method. Second, expedited land redistribution allows government
investment in agriculture to accrue directly to land recipients rather than to
current landowners, and therefore leads to a more equitable economic
growth.
240 Id. at 5.
24' WB, Taiwan Institute Assisting, supra note 191.
242 William A. de Lange Jr., DAR. Farmer-groups Criticize WB Report On Agrarian Reform
Program, BUs.WORLD (Manila), Jun. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10165979.243 Feasibility Study, supra note 8.
244 See PUTZEL, supra note 3, at 3.
245 RA 6657, supra note 5, § 2.
246 Rose Guzman, the research head of the IBON Foundation, a Philippine research group, has stated,
"[m]arket-oriented land reform defeats social justice." Feasibility Study. supra note 8.
VOL. 9 No. 3
PHILIPPINE LAND REFORM
1. Mandatory Redistribution is an Efficient Method of Land Reallocation
The basic premise of mandatory redistribution carries several benefits
in terms of efficiency in land redistribution. In a mandatory redistribution
system, the government gives land directly to peasants rather than giving
them money to buy land. Government action to take and redistribute the
land will increase the efficiency of redistribution by saving transaction
costs.248 These transaction costs may include the process of identifying land
available for sale and negotiating a sale. Further, administrative action will
allow more coordination in time and place of redistribution than the more
random, market-driven redistribution. 49  Finally, some potential
beneficiaries who might be discouraged by requirements of acquiring land
through a negotiated sale system can still participate under the traditional
model.25°
The redistribution achieved under mandatory redistribution in the
Philippines has improved standards of living. Recent empirical studies have
shown that beneficiaries of both PD 27 and CARP have had higher incomes
than non-beneficiaries. I25  Consequently, these households have been able to
access significantly more education and health care services for their
families. 2
2. The Swift Land Redistribution of a Mandatory Mechanism will Lead
to Future Equitable Economic Growth
An expedited redistribution under the traditional model could
complete CARP's redistribution targets in several years. This would free up
large pools of money in the government's budget, previously allocated to
land redistribution, that could then be invested in agricultural support
services. These investments in agricultural support services would accrue to
a larger number of landowners than currently exist, resulting in greater
253equity. Only when productive assets, particularly agricultural lands, are
247 See supra Part V.A.
248 Banerjee, supra note 25, at 15. This argument assumes that redistributed land is not immediately
saleable. Id. at 16.
249 Id. at 23.
2s0 Proponents of market-assisted land reform have pointed to this characteristic as an advantage of
market-assisted land reform because it has the potential to eliminate inefficient beneficiary farmers who
might reduce agricultural sector efficiency if they were given land. See id. at 30.
251 Deininger Philippines, supra note 214, at 18, 32.
252 Id. at 22.
23 See supra Part Ml.C.4.
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controlled equitably will growth in productivity benefit rural Filipinos. 254
History has shown that the "trickle-down effect ' 255 has not worked for the
poor in developing countries, where the distribution of assets was unequal
before growth enhancement programs began.256 As long as the distribution
of rural assets remains unequal, Philippine government investment in
agricultural support services will accrue mostly to current landowners,
increasing their economic and political power, and thereby increasing
resistance to future agrarian reforms.
257
B. Market-Assisted Land Redistribution will not Effectively Achieve
Equitable Reform
Market-assisted redistribution programs will not effectively achieve
equitable land reform for several reasons: (1) it is dependant on the amount
of land on the market at a given time; (2) land market imperfections often
artificially increase land prices; (3) many landowners will choose not to sell
their lands to beneficiaries due to various non-economic factors; and (4) the
tax policy changes necessary for market-assisted land reform are difficult to
implement.
1. Inadequate Land Supply on the Regular Market
Under the market-assisted land reform model, the number of targeted
beneficiaries that acquire land through the land reform program is limited by
the amount of land that is for sale on the market at any given time.
Advocates of market-assisted land reform have failed to address the
limitations of using the land market to achieve swift redistribution of a large
percentage of a nation's agricultural land. 259 Experts acknowledge that the
quantity of land available for sale must exceed the land needed by potential
2 Risking Reform, supra note 113, at 2-3.
235 The term "trickle-down effect" refers to the theoretical phenomenon by which sustained economic
growth that may occur initially with a country's wealthy class will eventually spread to the entire economy.
Adelman & Robinson, supra note 15, at 952.
256 See id. at 984.
257 See supra Part II.C.4.
258 Banerjee, supra note 25, at 30.
259 Jeffrey M. Riedinger, & Wan-Ying Yang, Problems Plague Market-Based Land Reform: The
Cases of Brazil, Colombia, the Philippines and South Africa, Apr. 22, 1999 (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
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beneficiaries for successful redistribution under a market-assisted system.2 °
This requirement is necessary to ensure a buyer's market for land that should
keep land prices low and facilitate transactions between peasants and
landlords. 261 However, the amount of land that is on the market at any given
time in the Philippines is substantially less than would be required by the
many landless peasants waiting to become landowners.262 Although policies
can be implemented to increase the amount of land for sale, 263 the
percentage of land on the market is not likely to increase significantly
enough to benefit the number of potential beneficiaries waiting for land.
2. Land Price Increases
A second limitation to redistribution under market-assisted land
redistribution programs is that land prices would likely increase as a result of
the agrarian reform program that subsidizes land sales and invests in
agricultural support services. Theoretically, market-assisted land reform
includes the implementation of policies intended to reduce land market
prices, facilitating greater accessibility of the land market by poor farmers.265
However, at least two other components of the market-assisted model would
likely work against these price-reducing strategies. First, given the high
profile of CARP in the rural areas, land purchase negotiations would be
conducted with the knowledge that other beneficiaries are waiting for
approval to purchase land. This information would likely drive up land
266prices. Second, investment in agricultural support services and
infrastructure, important for ensuring the success of land reform
beneficiaries, would also drive up agricultural land prices. The consequence
of these likely land price increases is that government subsidies or buyers'
reliance on credit would also have to increase.
260 Land Policy, supra note 14, at 27. In Colombia, municipios have to prove that land supply is three
times greater than demand by potential beneficiaries before their area is approved for land reform funding.Id.
261 Id.
262 See Riddell, supra note 38, at 11-12.
263 See Bryant, supra note 220.
264 See Riddell, supra note 38, at 11-12; Interview with Professor Timothy Hanstad, University of
Washington School ofLaw (May 2, 2000).
26 Deininger South Africa, supra note 212, at 7.
266 A limited price range could be imposed on buyers and sellers in market-assisted land reform
transactions. However, attempts to reduce landlord compensation would likely invite more of the same
landlord resistance that currently plagues CARP. See supra Part IV.C.I.
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3. Non-Economic Factors
Market-assisted redistribution is also limited by non-economic factors.
Specifically, landlords are unwilling to transfer their land because of its high
social and political value in the rural areas.267 Philippine land reform expert
Professor Jeff Riedinger stated that "[t]he depth of landowner opposition to
land redistribution suggests an attachment to land that transcends economic
concerns. '268 For over 100 years land ownership has been associated with
prestige and political power in the Philippines. 269  Therefore, as land
redistribution will likely lead to a redistribution of political power, currently
powerful elites will not likely be eager to hasten the process by voluntarily
submitting their land for redistribution. For example, some landowners have
demonstrated their unwillingness to submit to redistribution by breaking the
law. 270 At the local level, politically powerful landlords resist redistribution
through illegal land use conversions and physical threats to prospective
beneficiaries. 271 At the national level, land redistribution under CARP faces
landowner resistance in the form of political pressure put on legislators to
reduce the DAR's land acquisition budget.272 In short, landowners that have
demonstrated unwillingness to submit to compulsory land reform are
unlikely to voluntarily offer their lands for redistribution under a market-
assisted land reform unless they are paid very high prices for land. Neither
poor peasants nor the Philippine government through land purchase grants
can afford to pay the high prices likely to be demanded by landowners under
a market-assisted program.
4. Tax Policy Changes Will Be Difficult to Implement
The Philippine government will have great difficulty implementing
the tax policy changes included in the World Bank's proposal.273 Removing
267 See Banerjee, supra note 25, at 13.
266 Riedinger & Yang, supra note 259.
269 PUTZEL, supra note 3, at 60-61.
270 See generally BORRAS, supra note 7, at 85-114.
271 See ANGOC, supra note 151.
272 See BORRAS, supra note 7, at 22. While the national political barrier has recently been a
significant obstacle to land reform, successes at the local level indicate that national level success may be
possible. Id. In a speech made to European donors, Secretary Morales directly contradicted the commonly
held belief that successful land reform cannot occur in a democratic context. See DAR Chief Says
Government Committed to Making Land Reform a Success, BUS.WORLD Jun. 7, 1999 [hereinafter
Committed]. If foreign donors join the collaborations between grassroots peasant organizations and the
DAR, the national barriers could potentially be overcome.
273 See supra Part V.B.4.
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the tax breaks currently offered for investment in agricultural business is a
prerequisite to their proposal because it theoretically frees up more land for
sale on the land market and reduces land prices.274 Landowners who use
agricultural land as a tax shelter for other business interests would likely
oppose such tax reforms at the local and national levels. 275 The World Bank
proposal also suggests that revenue from better collection of local land taxes
will supply a large portion of the funding for market-assisted land reform.276
However, improved tax collection from wealthy landlords who have already
demonstrated their opposition to further taxes under the Ramos
administration would likely prove difficult.
277
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Changes to CARP and the way it is implemented are necessary to
swiftly and successfully redistribute the remaining CARP lands.
Specifically, the valid criticisms of CARP278 that have led to calls for a new
redistribution strategy must be addressed. CARP should be changed so that
it conforms to the basic elements of traditional land reform programs.
279
The Philippine government, NGOs, foreign governments, and other donors
all have important roles in achieving social justice for rural Filipinos through
land redistribution.
A. The Philippine Government Should Recommit to Social Justice
The Philippine government, beginning with the Estrada
administration, must reaffirm that social justice is the primary purpose of
Philippine agrarian reform. It should recognize that mandatory
redistribution of lands, particularly private lands, is one of the primary tools
274 Riedinger & Yang, supra note 259.
275 Id.
276 See supra Part V.B.4.
277 Risking Reform, supra note 113, at 2; but see Deininger Philippines, supra note 214, at 5 (the
World Bank's proposal suggests that landowners may be more willing to pay local taxes if they are
convinced that payment of taxes will exclude them from being subject to the threat of expropriative land
reform). Proponents of market-assisted land reform may further argue that NGO-govenmment
collaborations that have produced some favorable results under CARP could be harnessed to advocate for
these tax reforms. However, local grassroots organizations will likely not support these tax reforms if they
are implemented to prepare for a shift to a market-assisted land reform program. Deininger Philippines,
supra note 214, at 5.
278 See supra Part V.B.I.
279 See supra Part V.A; see also SAUtLO-ADRIANO, supra note 13, at 76. The key factors identified in
the other successful Asian land reforms of Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea were organized peasants,
foreign aid, and effective domestic administration. Id.
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to that end. Peasants await government action in the form of budget
allocations and actual land acquisitions rather than mere rhetoric.
280
Although it would be preferable to invest more money in both land
acquisition and support services for beneficiaries, land acquisition funds
should take first priority in the context of limited budgets.
28
'
Several legislative or policy changes are needed to bring CARP
implementation in line with the objective of achieving social justice for
peasants. These changes include subsidizing the required beneficiary
payments, implementing DAR employee incentives, deregulating tenancy
and rental markets, simplifying and decentralizing CARP implementation,
and developing a comprehensive land use policy.
1. The Government Should Subsidize Beneficiary Amortization Payments
The government should reduce the burden of beneficiary families by
subsidizing a portion of the required payments. The land valuation
processes of the DAR have set land values higher than market prices in
many cases to appease disgruntled landowners.282 These high land values
undermine the value of land redistribution by placing large repayment
demands on beneficiaries. Therefore, the government should subsidize
beneficiary payments at least to the extent that the compensation rate
exceeds the market price of the land.283
2. The Government Should Provide Performance Incentives to DAR
Employees
The administration should introduce incentives to reward DAR
employees who redistribute land effectively. Incentives could be linked to
the number of hectares acquired, the number of beneficiaries helped, and the
number of landowners compensated. The types of incentives offered could
280 Risking Reform, supra note 113, at 3.
281 See id. at 2-3. Any government investment for support services that is made concurrently with
mandatory expropriation of lands under CARP should be targeted to new beneficiaries. The current
Philippine financial strain makes large budget allocations to the DAR more difficult to achieve politically.
These limitations force the Philippine legislators to prioritize between mass redistribution and adequate
investment in support services. Support services for new farmer-beneficiaries are important to achieving
long-term social justice because if beneficiaries are unable to succeed as farmers they may be forced to
abandon their lands and will not benefit from future economic growth initiatives. However, actual land
redistribution is irreplaceable to achieving social justice for peasants under the assumption that equitable
growth cannot occur while the significant factors of production are distributed unequally. Id.
282 Id. at 3.
283 Risking Reform, supra note 113, at 3.
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include immediate pay increases and hiring preference in other government
departments when CARP is completed.284 Such a program would likely help
reduce illegal payoffs to DAR employees from landowners seeking to avoid
redistribution.
3. The Government Should Eliminate Restrictions on Tenancy
Agreements and the Land Rental Market
The government should eliminate restrictions on tenancy agreements
and the land rental market because these regulations are impractical to
administer effectively and they exacerbate the problem of landlessness for
those who have little chance of becoming CARP beneficiaries. 285  In
programs such as CARP that give preference to former tenants as potential
land recipients, non-tenant farm laborers have little opportunity to acquire
land.286  Further, the number of non-tenant farm laborers is high because
current regulations on tenancy encourage landowners to avoid taking
tenants. For example, to avoid the restrictions put on tenancy or rental
agreements, landowners often resort to informal agreements that provide
even less security for peasants.287 To the extent that landowners refuse to
rent out land because of the threat of administrative penalty, opportunities
for landless peasants to access land are reduced. 88 Thus, the government
should eliminate restrictions on tenancy in the Philippines to allow more
farm laborers the opportunity to benefit from CARP.
4. The Government Should Develop a Comprehensive Land Use Policy
To address the problem of land use conversions as vehicles for
landowners to simultaneously evade land reform and use prime agricultural
lands for non-agricultural purposes, the government should implement a
284 Id. The DAR should also ensure that adequate monitoring systems exist to prevent corruption in
new employee incentive programs.
285 Id. at 2. Logic suggests that regulation of tenancy agreements and the land rental market would
benefit peasants, preventing them from abusive relationships with landowners. In the Philippines, however,
where the administrative and legal systems are underdeveloped, these regulations simply encourage
landowners to make informal agreements with their tenants, allowing potentially even more abuse of the
tenant. Id.
286 Deininger Philippines, supra note 214, at 22. Between 1985 and 1998, the probability of a
landless person accessing land in the Philippines decreased by 60%. It is estimated that CARP restrictions
on rental and tenancy agreements have significantly contributed to this reduction. Id.
287 Land Policy, supra note 14, at 24. In the Philippines, regulation of land rental markets has created
widespread wage labor on farms, which is less efficient in terms of agricultural productivity than rental or
tenancy arrangements. Id.
2 Deininger Philippines, supra note 214, at 21-22.
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national land use policy.289 This policy should set priorities for the various
possible uses of agricultural lands and should restore the authority to grant
land use conversion applications on CARP lands to the DAR.29° It should
also set a framework for the creation of an "equity-sensitive" land market.291
A well-enforced, comprehensive land use law would deter landowners from
converting their agricultural land to non-agricultural uses outside the scope
of CARP and would provide opportunities for tenant and farm laborers to
begin to access the land market.
B. Philippine Peasant Organizations Should Seek More Collaborations
Peasant organizations in the rural areas must collaborate politically at
the national and local levels. 292  Individual peasants must mobilize
themselves in a coordinated effort to support national land reformers within
Congress and the DAR. When peasant groups and DAR officials
collaborate, land redistribution can occur even against the will of locally
powerful elites.293 In one particular example, tenants on a mango farm
owned by a locally powerful landowner were fraudulently induced by the
landowner to give up their tenancy rights, which would have allowed them
rights to become CARP land recipients. 294 These tenants, with the support
of a local NGO that had ties to regional and national activists, attracted
national media attention to their plight.295 After the tenants forced entry to
the land, the landowner tried to discourage the tenants by tying them up in
296court. However, in 1998, six years after securing the assistance of a local
peasant organization, the DAR finally redistributed the eighteen hectares in
dispute to the tenants.297
C. Foreign Governments and Other Donors Should Support Social
Justice Efforts
DAR Secretary Horacio Morales has stated, "... donor support can be
a political corrective to the dominance of the urban-based elite in a
289 See Risking Reform, supra note 113, at 1.
290 See id. at 2.
291 SAULO-ADRIANO, supra note 13, at 66-67.
292 BORRAS, supra note 7, at 134-35.
293 See id. at 85-114.
294 Id. at 86-91.
295 Id. at 87.
296 Id. at 89.
297 Id. at 90.
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developing country such as ours. '298  Foreign donors from wealthier
countries generally support efforts of third world countries to improve the
welfare and empowerment of poor citizens, ensure peaceful resolution of
civil conflict, and enhance economic efficiency. 29 Improved welfare of
peasants, 3 °° defused civil conflict,30' and increased agricultural efficiency
30 2
are the expected results of land reform under an enhanced mandatory
redistribution program in the Philippines. Therefore, foreign donors should
support CARP's compelled redistribution as an effective preparation for
equitable economic growth.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Prior Philippine land reforms have not achieved equitable land
redistribution for the poor because design flaws and opportunistic
landowners limited them. Although more substantial than previous land
reform attempts, CARP has also been ineffective in redistributing private
lands. Redistribution under CARP must be completed before rural equity
can be realized. However, forces from both inside and outside the
Philippines oppose the swift and extensive redistribution of private lands.
The DAR has two redistribution mechanisms to choose from for the
completion of land redistribution under CARP: mandatory land
redistribution and market-assisted land redistribution.
Mandatory redistribution of land is the only option that offers the
hope of achieving the purpose of agrarian reform. As recognized by CARP,
the primary objective of Philippine agrarian reform is social justice for rural
2 Committed, supra note 272.
299 Hanstad, supra note 264.
300 See supra Part VI.A.
301 See generally BATARA, supra note 4, at 81-84. Peasant organizations have indicated that they will
not receive market-assisted land reform as the genuine redistributive reform they have been calling for
because they perceive it as an even greater concession of power to landlords and agribusiness. Peasants
have been extremely critical of CARP since its inception, accusing policy-makers and administrators of
selling out to the interests of wealthy landlords. Anger over perceived defects in CARP has spawned both
violent and non-violent protest. Any land reform that fails to expedite the redistribution of the remaining
CARP lands, particularly the contentious private lands, will arouse further anger. Id.
302 See generally Risking Reform, supra note 113, at 3-4. More extensive redistribution under the
traditional land reform model will theoretically lead to greater productivity since lands farmed by owner-
operators are generally more efficient than larger farms. Previous CARP beneficiaries, farming a wide
variety of crops, have increased the productivity of their land. The Philippine government should focus its
resources on immediately redistributing the remaining CARP lands so that larger and less efficient estates
will be dispersed and so that landless peasants will be in a position to take advantage of future investments
in agriculture. An expedited redistribution will free up a large pool of resources in several years that can be
invested in agricultural support services, which are likely to lead to further increases in agricultural
productivity. Id.
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Filipinos. Market-assisted reform cannot achieve this objective, because
swift redistribution of such a large amount of land renders market-assisted
land reform impracticable. The traditional land reform model, including
mandatory redistribution of private lands, is best designed to effect social
justice by redistributing the maximum amount of land.
Focused action and increased political will on the part of the DAR,
grassroots organizations, and foreign donors can overcome the current
barriers to land redistribution under CARP. Such an effort will be necessary
to expedite the completion of CARP, which will increase economic stability
and lay a framework for continued equitable rural economic growth in the
Philippines.
